Political Reform in the Arab World

DATE July 20, 2006 ACCOUNT NUMBER N/A
TIME 12:00 Noon-1:00 PM AUDIENCE N/A
NETWORK NPR
PROGRAM Fresh Air

Interview: Julia Choucair of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace discusses Lebanon, the role of Hezbollah and
the current conflict with Israel
TERRY GROSS, host:

This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross.

Why has Lebanon allowed Hezbollah to have its own militia? Here to talk about
this and other questions relating to Hezbollah and Lebanon is Julia Choucair.
She's with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She's an associate
in Carnegie's Democracy and Rule of Law Project and deputy editor of the Arab
Reform Bulletin. Earlier this year, she wrote a paper titled "Lebanon:
Finding a Path From Deadlock to Democracy." She's Lebanese and has lived in
the US for about six years.

Julia Choucair, welcome to FRESH AIR. What are you hearing from friends and
family in Lebanon and where are they in Lebanon?

Ms. JULIA CHOUCAIR: Well, I'm hearing different views depending on where
they are in Lebanon. So far the bombing has been targeted in the sense that
it has not yet hit downtown Beirut or, I guess, the central areas of Beirut.
This changed yesterday when they started hitting some Christian parts, but
primarily they have targeted the southern suburbs of Beirut and also, of
course, southern Lebanon. And so from family and friends who were in southern
Beirut for vacation, they have, of course, left and are now taking refuge in
northern Lebanon. Others have been evacuated, those with foreign
nationalities, primarily Europeans. I believe Americans are still waiting to
hear from the embassy, but they should be evacuated in the next couple of
days. So it's a mixed picture depending on where you are in Lebanon. But, in
general, the consensus is that this is very shocking, that nobody was
expecting it, and that there is a widespread sense of panic. Everybody trying
to get out because they don't know if this will be done in two weeks or if
this might escalate and even become a regional conflict.

GROSS: And your family's all safe right now?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Yes. Fortunately.

GROSS: What's your impression of how the bombing is affecting opinion within
Lebanon of Hezbollah and of Israel?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, again, I think it depends on who you speak to in
Lebanon. Lebanon is a very divided society, particularly in the past couple
of years, because Lebanon is currently going through a transitional process,
which was started with the death of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in
2005. He was assassinated in February 14 of 2005. And that divided Lebanon
into two camps, and this is, of course, a generalization. But, in general,
politicians and also their constituents were divided into two camps, an
anti-Syria coalition and a pro-Syria coalition. And basically because those
who were in the anti-Syria coalition believed that Syrians were behind the
assassination of the prime minister. And the debates that ensued from that
into the international pressure on Syria eventually resulted in a Syrian
withdrawal from Lebanon. And so it depends who you speak to from those camps
inside Lebanon right now.

What I hear is the Shiites constituents of Hezbollah are, of course, not
losing, you know, not losing their support for Hezbollah. In fact, this is
consolidating Hezbollah's position as a defender of Lebanon against Israeli
aggression. It is proving Hezbollah's mantra that Israel will always be
hostile toward Lebanon and that Israel will always have reason to attack
Lebanon, and therefore it is enforcing this rationale for Hezbollah bearing
arms and basically defending the country against Israeli aggression. That is
on the one side.

In the other side, those who are not supportive of Hezbollah and those who
have been trying to launch a debate about Hezbollah disarming and have been
pushing for Hezbollah to disarm on the grounds that, as a political party,
Hezbollah should not be allowed to have arms just like any of the other
political parties do not bear arms. That basically force should be a monopoly
of the Lebanese state, not of one particular party. And so from their point
of view, they are very enraged at Hezbollah's actions. They believe that
Hezbollah should have not had the right to decide whether Lebanon should go to
war or be at peace with Israel. And so, again, the response to these actions
are mixed.

GROSS: Are you concerned about the war spreading? Do you think that that is
likely?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: In terms of a regional conflict, I believe that if Hezbollah
were to strike Tel Aviv, or if Israel believed that, you know, let's say in
two weeks they have not been able to stop Hezbollah from continuing to fire
rockets, I believe then--I mean, this is complete speculation--but analysts
believe that they might try to pressure Syria to put more pressure on
Hezbollah. And in that sense, yes, we might see a spread of this conflict.
But so far, for the next couple of weeks, I see it being limited to Lebanon.

And one of the dangers is that this conflict might spread within Lebanon.
This is something the Lebanese are very worried about. And this has to do
with the rationale behind this military campaign to rid Hezbollah of its arms.
I believe that part of the assumption behind this military campaign is that if
you can weaken Hezbollah to the point where you would deploy an international
force in the southern border, but also you would expect the other Lebanese
parties to be able to disarm Hezbollah. And I think this is a very dangerous
assumption because of the nature of Lebanon and because disarming Hezbollah
without Hezbollah's consent would be very dangerous, and it would only be done
in a violent way inside Lebanon. So there is fear among the Lebanese that
this could create a civil conflict like the one, you know, we had 15 years
ago.

GROSS: And this would be coming at a time when Lebanon was becoming much more
democratic.

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Yes. This is coming at a transitional time for Lebanon when
Lebanon is really trying to revamp its economy, or some issues that have been
taboo for the past 30 years are actually being put on the table: like the
question of the electoral law, like the question of security reform, what to
do about Hezbollah's arms. And so Lebanon was really at a key moment in its
history. But at the same time, it's been a very fragile moment in its history
because of how divisive these issues are. And so there's great potential, but
there's also great danger as to what can happen in Lebanon.

GROSS: Israel is famous for some of its surgical strikes like in Entebbe.
But Israeli leaders have said you can't do surgical strikes on Hezbollah
because the leadership of Hezbollah and the weapons are integrated into the
neighborhoods of south Lebanon. You know, that even the rockets are
integrated into the neighborhoods. Does that strike you as an accurate
picture?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: I'm not an expert on the military capabilities of Hezbollah or
where they keep them inside Lebanon, but I do know that, yes, their
headquarters and where these leaders live--including Nasrallah--they live in
very populous neighborhoods, primarily in the southern suburbs of Lebanon,
this area called Dahia. And so that's where they live. And, yes, these are
very populated areas. They live in buildings with families and businesses.
And so, yes, in that sense, any attempt to target at least, you know, the
houses where these leaders live would be targeting civilians who live in those
areas.

GROSS: Do most of the civilians who live in those areas consider themselves
followers of or advocates of Hezbollah?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Hezbollah's constituency is Shiite. They represent the
majority of the Shiite community, which in itself is also the biggest group in
Lebanon. So they do represent a large part of the Shiite group, and many poor
Shiites live in the southern suburb. Shias who left southern Lebanon during
the Lebanese civil war and also during the Israeli occupation of southern
Lebanon, and so they left as refugees and came to Beirut and settled in these
suburbs because they were more affordable. And so primarily that's where
Hezbollah's constituency comes from. It's those Shias Lebanese living in
those areas. But there are also many other Shias living in the southern
suburbs who do not support Hezbollah and who are either for the other Shia
party, Amal. It's basically Hezbollah came out of Amal. It used to be Amal
and then broke off. And Amal is also a Shia party, but it is not an Islamist.
It is a secular brand of Shia politics in Lebanon. And so some are supporters
of that, and some are independent Shias who do not support either Hezbollah
nor Amal, but because of the nature of the Lebanese state have no
representation of their own or have no politicians to represent them. So I
would not say that everybody in those areas being targeted is a Hezbollah
supporter.

GROSS: My guest is Julia Choucair of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. More after a break. This is FRESH AIR.

(Announcements)

GROSS: My guest is Julia Choucair of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.

Why has Hezbollah been allowed to have its own militia?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, I mean, you have to look at the history of how Hezbollah
was formed. Hezbollah was formed after the Israeli occupation, the siege in
Beirut in 1982. That's when they broke off from the Amal party. And they
were armed and their primary target was the Israeli soldiers who were in
Beirut and also in southern Lebanon. And so initially they were created as an
underground group and became, in the eyes of many Lebanese, a resistant
movement against Israeli aggression because the Lebanese army was so weak and
because it was divided during the war. But then after the war, when the war
ended, because the Lebanese army was too weak to be able to actually defend
Lebanon, Hezbollah was allowed to keeps its arms as a resistance army, or
that's what it was called inside Lebanon.

And the Taif Agreement, which is the agreement that ended the Lebanese civil
war--and it was signed in Saudi Arabia in 1990--clearly specifics that all
militias inside Lebanon would be disarmed. But the politicians signing the
agreements, it was an unwritten rule that Hezbollah would not disarm because
Hezbollah was not necessarily a militia but rather a form of resistance for
Lebanon against Israel. So this is the background.

This, of course, changed in 2000 when Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon.
Many politicians inside Lebanon started calling for Hezbollah disarmaments on
the grounds that there was no longer an occupation. And this weakens
Hezbollah's role because Hezbollah has always been able to play both roles
very well simultaneously. One, the role of a Lebanese political party, very
active inside Lebanon with various parliamentarians--currently I believe they
have 14--providing many services for the Shia community. But at the same
time, also the role of this national resistance movement providing defense for
the Lebanese against Israel. So in 2000, it saw this role being undermined
but the Lebanese, I mean, it was not a serious debate because the Lebanese
government and other Lebanese parties are not strong enough to be able to
disarm Hezbollah.

GROSS: So besides firing Katyusha rockets across the border into Israel, what
function does Hezbollah play--the Hezbollah militia play in southern Lebanon?
What does it do?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, primarily Hezbollah provides all the services for the
residents of southern Lebanon. They run schools, they run hospitals, they run
orphanages, charity groups. And so, in fact, they--for all intents and
purposes--run or govern southern Lebanon, some villages of course. Other
villages are governed by Amal, which is the other Shia group. And this has
been the case. In 2000, when Israel withdrew, Amal and Hezbollah sort of
divided up the villages amongst themselves, and so that is the role of
Hezbollah in some of these villages. It's basically governance, governs them.

GROSS: What about the militia? The militia isn't the political part. What
is the militia?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, the militia itself just patrols the border with Israel.
But, you know, within Lebanon they do not--I mean, Hezbollah has not used its
arms in recent history against the Lebanese. And as far as I know the,
militia does not have a military role inside Lebanon. It's role is that of
patrolling the border and, as you said, launching rockets across Israel.

GROSS: And does it have the silent or spoken approval of the Lebanese
government and the Lebanese military to fire those rockets into Israel? Or
did it before this conflict started?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, the Lebanese government's position has been that Israel
continues to violate its agreement by flying over Lebanese air space and also
by, in the past, firing into Lebanon. So the unspoken agreement is that you
need a deterrent force in the south, that Hezbollah would play the part of
deterring Israel entering Lebanon or Israel attacking Lebanon. So that used
to be the case. Recently there has been a series of national dialog sessions
which were between all the major parties in Lebanon, and these were launched
about six months ago. And the goal behind these sessions was to discuss these
issues.

The top issue on the agenda was Hezbollah's arms. And many elements in the
Lebanese government, primarily the prime minister, have been pushing for
Hezbollah to disarm, particularly in the past two years. But this is still an
issue that was on the table. It was being discussed. It was a very difficult
issue to solve. And I think the Lebanese government at the end of the day
realize that this issue is not just a Lebanese internal issue, that even if
there was consensus among most parties in Lebanon that Hezbollah should
disarm, that this could not occur because Hezbollah continues to play its role
as a--basically its regional role as a defender of Arab rights against Israel.
Or that is the role they're seeking to play. And so the Lebanese government
realized that ultimately Hezbollah's disarmament will only occur within this
larger regional framework, within a larger peace agreement perhaps between
Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon. So the Lebanese government realizes
it is powerless at this point to push for this.

GROSS: But why is it powerless? I mean, it's the government and Hezbollah's
militia is one group's militia.

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Right. Well you have to look at the nature of the Lebanese
state. Lebanon, while it appears to be a functional democracy in the sense
that it has more freedoms or personal liberties than many Arab countries and
has always been seen as this beacon of freedom in the Middle East, unlike
other Arab states, Lebanon has no powerful national government. In fact, its
biggest challenge or its biggest curse, I guess, is that it lacks a central
authority. The manner in which political power is distributed in Lebanon, it
is distributed among various sects which are de facto, serve as mini-states
for their constituents. So citizens are represented through these sects that
are themselves represented in government. And so there is no consensus or
common agenda. And therefore, no majority group in Lebanon has the ability to
impose its will on the rest because, for example, when the leaders of the
major communities can agree on specific issues, then they can push forward
these issues. But when they cannot get things accomplished, and when they
cannot agree, as for example on the disarmament issue, then the entire system
is paralyzed because the states lack the central authority and the, you know,
institutionalized decision making ability to be able to push for these
changes. It is a very segmented political landscape. And, I mean, this has
been Lebanon's curse for decades, and it has, you know, haunted its
independence, and it's one of the main reasons for the civil war.

GROSS: Is Hezbollah in any way a surrogate of the Lebanese military when it
was firing missiles, you know, rockets over the border into Israel? That's
something that the Lebanese military wouldn't do, couldn't do? But Hezbollah
could do it. So did it have the kind of silent approval of the military or
the government?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, the Lebanese military couldn't fire rockets against
Israel because of its military capabilities, but also firing rockets would be
a declaration of war between two sovereign states. What had happened in the
past is, yes, Hezbollah has been able to fire these rockets without Lebanon
paying for it because Hezbollah does not represent the Lebanese state.
Hezbollah is a militant group and a political party inside Lebanon, but it
makes its own decisions and is not reflective of a decision by the larger
Lebanon state to go to war with Israel.

And so I wouldn't say it was approval. I would just say, as I've said before,
that the Lebanese army and the Lebanese government could do nothing about it.
Whether they approved or did not approve, Hezbollah would go ahead and fire
these rockets.

In the past when Israel was in southern Lebanon, the Lebanese state believed
that the territory was occupied. And at that time there was overt support for
Hezbollah's fight because they were defending national sovereignty and also

trying to retrieve territory that was Lebanese. But after 2000, this changed.
And because there was no longer Israeli presence inside Lebanon, there was
less of a reason for Hezbollah to have arms and to be firing against Israel.
But whether the--this is a very important point is that whether the Lebanese
government would like or would not like is really irrelevant as to Hezbollah's
rationale for acting in southern Lebanon.

GROSS: Julia Choucair is with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
She'll be back in the second half of the show. I'm Terry Gross, and this is
FRESH AIR.

(Announcements)

GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross back with Julie Choucair with the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She's an associate in Carnegie's
Democracy and Rule of Law Project and deputy editor of the Arab Reform
Bulletin. Choucair is Lebanese and has lived in the US for about six years.

The Lebanese prime minister has made impassioned pleas to Israel and to the
world to, you know, get Israel to stop the bombing. But the Lebanese
government has not said that they consider this an act of war against Lebanon.
in other words, the Lebanese government and the Lebanese military are not
thinking of themselves as being at war with Israel. And I guess I'm wondering
why they're not interpreting it as an act of war against their country. Is
it--go ahead.

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Yeah, well I think they interpreting it as an act of war, as
an act of aggression, but I think the prime minister is trying to create a
cease-fire. I think he's trying to stop this from escalating. I think he
also knows it would be self-defeating for Lebanon to go to war as a state
against Israel because of the severely mismatched military capabilities. And
so I think it is not in Lebanon's interest and in the prime minister's
interest to launch a war against Israel. So what he is trying to do is to
focus on the fact that this was not the Lebanese government pursuing an act of
aggression against Israel, that this was an independent act on the part of
Hezbollah, hoping that the international community will act and will at least
call for an immediate cease-fire because Lebanon's economy's being destroyed,
civilians are being killed, and so I think the prime minister is trying to
basically create damage control at this point and is pleading, like you said,
the international community to act. So the last thing he would want to do is
to officially declare war and have this crisis escalate.

GROSS: The United States is waiting to send Condoleezza Rice to the Middle
East. What do you think the international community could be doing to stop
the fighting?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, I think right now there is a need for the international
community to call for an immediate cease-fire. I don't think any diplomatic
intervention or any negotiation is going to occur under the current
circumstances with bombing going on on both sides. And with I think the death
count in Lebanon is past the 250. They're primarily civilians. And so I
think the first thing that needs to be done is an immediate cease-fire.

Now, beyond that, I think it is very important--I think this is a wake-up call
for the United States and for European countries to realize that they need to
be directly engaging in the Arab-Israeli conflict. That in the past six
years, particularly under this US administration, the US has focused its
strategic goals on eliminating the troublemakers in the region. And those
trouble makers were Iraq, Libya, Syria and Iran and, of course, Hezbollah and
Hamas. And so the idea was that by going after these instigators you could
change a strategic environment and make these conflicts or these problems
easier to deal with. I think this particular crisis shows that that approach
is flawed and that there is a severe need for the United States primarily to
address directly these conflicts and to reengage in the peace process.

And what we are seeing is that the United States lacks the diplomatic tools to
be able to control this crisis right now because they cannot directly speak to
Iran, they cannot directly speak to Syria and they cannot directly speak to
Hezbollah. And so the most that can be done is speak to one of the parties in
the conflict, which is Israel. And so, I think, this crisis is showing that
there is a severe lack of diplomatic tools, as well as that there is a need to
reimagine or redefine how the US has been approaching the region and how the
European countries have been approaching the region.

GROSS: One theory I've heard is that, you know, Iran gave its green light for
Hezbollah to attack Israel because Iran wants to be dealt with. Iran wants
the United States to deal with it, to talk with it, to negotiate with it. And
this is a way of forcing the United States to deal directly with Iran. Do you
buy that theory?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, yes. I think most of these theories are just
speculation, but I do believe that this crisis could help Iran portray
itself--which is what it's been trying to do--as a powerful regional player,
as a powerful player in the larger Middle East and, in a sense, to show that
in a crisis like this they can both escalate it and they can also limit it and
even end it. I think this is an opportunity for Iran to prove to the US and
to other Arab countries that it is a powerful regional player and that it
wants to be taken seriously in discussions about the region, and that
isolating it and refusing to dialog with it is counterproductive. It wants to
prove that in a crisis like this, it could both either escalate the conflict,
and it can also limit the conflict. And so I think this would be an
opportunity for Iran to try to prove to the US that it needs to be taken
seriously in this crisis, and also at a larger sense in the region.

GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is Julia Choucair. She's an
expert on political reform in the Arab world. She's with the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, where she's an associate in the Democracy
and Rule of Law Project. And she's deputy editor of the Carnegie's Arab
Reform Bulletin.

Hezbollah was formed in 1982 after Israel drove the PLO out of Lebanon. And
Hezbollah was formed as an opposition group to Israel. Like Hamas, it calls
for the elimination of Israel. I guess one thing I've been wondering is if
Israel succeeds in its agenda of eliminating Hezbollah--Hezbollah is not a
government, it's not a country, it's an independent group--how popular do you
think its philosophy is, its agenda is? And if Hezbollah per se were wiped
out by this current war, do you think that there'd likely be another group
that would come along and replace it?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, I think that the assumption is flawed in the assumption
that Hezbollah can be wiped out in this conflict. And I think this is a key
point for understanding the crisis and for understanding Hezbollah's role.
There is an assumption that Hezbollah could be severely weakened and even
destroyed through a military campaign, as we are currently seeing. And this
idea's based on three assumptions. One, that Hezbollah can be defeated by
military force. Two, that the blame for Hezbollah's actions lies in Damascus
and Tehran. And, three, that the Lebanese power could have--the Lebanese
government--excuse me--could have the power to disarm Hezbollah. And I think
all these scenarios ignore the reality of the nature of Hezbollah's role in
Lebanon.

Hezbollah is deeply, deeply rooted in Lebanese society. Unlike the PLO, which
in 1982 was eventually driven out of Lebanon and taken on ships to Tunisia,
Hezbollah is composed of Lebanese members, both political armaments, the
military arm. And so, in a sense, Hezbollah's members are not going anywhere.
They are part of Lebanese society. And so I think to handle the challenge
that Hezbollah poses, you need a longer term vision and a longer term strategy
over what you're envisioning Hezbollah's role to be inside Lebanon.

A military campaign, as we are seeing right now, to try to wipe out Hezbollah
is also causing great damage to the Lebanese infrastructure and to the
Lebanese state as a whole. And the only hopes we have for Hezbollah to
eventually--for its role in Lebanon to be undermined is if you have the
creation of a strong Lebanese state, a Lebanese state that can provide
services for its citizens, and a Lebanese that can transcend this current
transitional period to be able to assert its influence over Hezbollah. But a
military campaign will--at the same time while you are trying to weaken

Hezbollah--you're also weakening the Lebanese government, which in the long
run is your only hope for reining in Hezbollah.

GROSS: Hezbollah's goals include creating an Islamic state and eliminating
Israel. How popular are those two parts of their agenda within Lebanon? I
mean, Lebanon has a pretty large Christian population. I can't imagine that
most Christians in Lebanon want to see an Islamic state.

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Right. Well, Hezbollah stopped speaking about this goal of an
Islamic state in the '90s, I believe. I mean, when they were first created
that was their goal, but I think Hezbollah realized that Lebanese society, as
you mentioned, is very diverse. There's a large Christian population.
There's also a large Sunni and Druze community. And so it realizes that this
goal in Lebanon is unattainable. And so in the past decade or so, I mean, I
have rarely--I have not heard any Hezbollah statements about them wanting to
impose Islamic rule in Lebanon. Rather they have focused on their role of
becoming a resistance movement or the role of fighting Israel. But I think
Hezbollah's leadership understands that given the diversity in Lebanon that
its goal is unattainable.

GROSS: And what about the Hezbollah goal of, you know, eliminating Israel?
Is that widely shared?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, I mean, again, it depends on who you talk to in Lebanon.
I believe that most Lebanese understand that there is no way to eliminate
Israel and that Israel is there to stay and that they share a border with
Israel. And I think many Lebanese--particularly in the past, I would say, 10
years--after the civil war, there is a feeling inside Lebanon that people are
sick and tired of conflict, that they are tired of war, and that they would
like to rebuild the economy, to rebuild the state. And there was a sense of
optimism that was created.

At the same time, there is a feeling among many Lebanese is southern Lebanon
that Israel continues to pose a grave challenge. The historical memory, I
mean, it wasn't that long ago that Israel was occupying Lebanon, and it wasn't
that long ago that Israel had a siege on Beirut. And so there is the sense
that there is a lack of trust that Israel will not reoccupy Lebanon or that
will not try to undermine Lebanon.

And so I think it's a mixed bag. And I think the only way you can address
these is through a comprehensive peace process that would address both the
Lebanon's issues with Israel and also Syria's issues with Israel. And I'm
referring here to the disputed territory of the Golan Heights, which is Syrian
territory that has been occupied by Israel since 1967. And so I think there
are large issues that need to be addressed.

GROSS: My guest is Julia Choucair of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. We'll talk more after a break. This is FRESH AIR.

(Announcements)

GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is Julia Choucair. She's works
with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where she's an associate
in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project and deputy editor of the Carnegie's
Arab Reform Bulletin.

You're an expert in democracy in the Arab world. The Bush administration has
tried an experiment in democracy by invading Iraq and forcibly creating regime
change and trying to create democracy. What impact do you think that
experiment is having on the Arab world? The ambition was to create democracy
in Iraq and to have the ripple effect spread through the Arab world and into
the Middle East.

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, I think Iraq has, far from being a model for
democratization in other Arab countries, has actually become the poster child
of what cannot happen or what should not be allowed to happen in the rest of
the region. I think many people look to Iraq and fear that this is what may
happen in their own countries if there is regime change. And, in fact, the
Arab regime has, you know, pounded on this and been very happy to use Iraq as
a scenario of, `Look what would happen if we were deposed.' You know, `This is
what you would get. You would get an Iraq.' And so across the region there is
fear, there is disgust at what is happening in Iraq, at the civil violence
there.

And it's also showed that democratization to the region cannot be brought
about my military intervention because of the nature of these societies,
because they're so divided along ethnic, sectarian lines, and because there is
no recent history of democratic culture or democratic practice. And most of
the opposition forces in these societies are very divided, usually they're led
by individuals, the leaders banking on their personal charisma. But you do
not have political parties with clear agendas, political opposition parties.
And so Iraq has not proved a model. And, in fact, is demonstrating to
democracy promoters that what you need in the region is a longer term process
that seeks to address, you know, some of the primary causes for why there is
no democracy. And there are many of these. It's not just the fact that
there's a dictator in power that needs to be deposed and then automatically
you'll have democracy.

GROSS: Let's talk a little bit more about what's happening in Lebanon now.
From what--you're from Lebanon. You grew up there. You know the country
well. From what you've been seeing and reading and hearing from friends and
family, are there a lot of parts of Lebanon that have been destroyed by the
bombing that were only recently rebuilt after the civil war?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Yes. Primarily civilian infrastructure, such as bridges and
highways, that were all rebuilt after the civil war. And I think the airport
being hit was also very significant for Lebanon because the airport was a
symbol of Lebanon reconstructing. During the civil war, Lebanon had a
terrible airport, and everybody would always comment about it. I mean, it was
depressing to just land into that airport in Beirut. And when the new airport
was built, it was just a symbol for the Lebanese and for foreigners who were
coming that Lebanon was really on its way up, that Lebanon was ready to
reconstruct, become a, you know, functional state and attract tourism and have
a functional economy. And so, yes, when the airport was hit, the bridges, the
highways, those are primarily the areas that were reconstructed after the war.

GROSS: What impact do you think this is going to have on life in Lebanon in
the near future?

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Well, in the near future, Lebanon--it's a devastating economic
shock for Lebanon because Lebanon has no industry or agriculture. It

basically survives on services. And the tourist season is very important for
Lebanon. And so these attacks have shattered hopes for this tourist season,
but I think also will affect Lebanon for years to come because, you know, it
has taken this long for Lebanese to convince the outside world that Lebanon is
a great place to visit, that it would be a good place for foreign investment,
that banks should set up there, that consulting firms should set up there.
And I think now, with this instability, these companies, these banks, and also
tourists are just not going to want to come Lebanon. So it will affect
Lebanon in the long term economically.

Also, I think, psychologically this is very devastating for Lebanon because
Lebanese citizens were really not expecting this to occur. Even though they
have lived through a civil war and despite the fact that there continue to be,
you know, acts of violence across the border, I do not believe that any
Lebanese citizen could have foreseen this occurring in Beirut. And so I think
psychologically this is going to be very difficult.

And here I'm painting the best case scenario for what could happen in Lebanon.
The worst case scenario is that this conflict escalates, that there is
pressure inside Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah forcefully, that militias will
arm, that the current Lebanese governments will disintegrate, that the
Lebanese army will breakup. It's a very bleak picture, but it's not one that
is--it is one that could occur. And so that would be the worst case scenario
for Lebanon.

GROSS: Well, Julia Choucair, thank you very much for talking with us.

Ms. CHOUCAIR: Thank you.

GROSS: Julia Choucair is deputy editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin and an
associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace. Our interview was recorded this morning.

Coming up, Ken Tucker reviews a new hip-hop album from the The Coup. This is
FRESH AIR.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Review: Ken Tucker on The Coup's "Pick a Bigger Weapon"
TERRY GROSS, host:

The Coup is essentially "Boots" Riley, and San Francisco Bay area
singer/songwriter who's just released a new album called "Pick a Bigger
Weapon." The Coup's hip-hop music is rooted in black power politics of the
'60s, and, says rock critic Ken Tucker, uses melodies to both complement and
contrast with its message.

(Soundbite of "The Stand")

Mr. BOOTS RILEY: (Singing)
Now meet the rubber on my shoe or meet my...(censored by network)...demands
Here's the place where I take my stand.
Take my stick and draw a line in the sand.
Show my hand, initiate the actions plan
Now give me time for assault or give me back my clams.

As saltwater drips from my oculars
I got the urge to just...

(End of soundbite)

Mr. KEN TUCKER: The Coup, that's C-O-U-P as in coup d'etat, a decisive
change in government or politics, often by force. That's one heck of a name
to attach to your musical endeavor. But Boots Riley and his collaborating DJ
Pam the Funktress don't mess around. Or rather they do mess around with your
expectations of what pop music is supposed to contain or do. The Coup make
music that's heavy on funk riffs and beats. This new album includes backup my
members of Parliament Funkadelic and guitarist Tom Morello of the white funk
metal band Rage Against the Machine. But at the center of the rhythms are
Boots Riley's lyrics, which espouse sympathy for the black underclass and
calls to rise up and seize power. Riley is a propagandist, up front and proud
of it.

(Soundbite of "Head (of State)")

Mr. RILEY: (Singing)
In a land not very far away from here,
George W. Bush was drinking beer
His daddy was head of the CIA
Now listen up close to what I say
The CIA worked for Standard Oil
And other companies to whom they're loyal
In a whole 'nother land by the name of Iran
The people got wise and took a stand
to the oil companies, ay, ain't...(censored by network)...funny?
This is our oil, our land, our money.
CIA got mad and sent false info
to Iraq to help start the Iran/Iraq wo'
Pronounced war if I have to be proper
The CIA is the cops that's why I hate the coppers
Saddam Hussein was their man out there
They told him to rule while keepin' people scared
Sayin' any opposition to him, he must crush it
He gassed the Kurds, they gave him his budget
Said you gotta kick...(censored by network)...to protect our cash
Step out of line and feel our wrath
You know the time without lookin' at the little hand

(End of soundbite)

Mr. TUCKER: Boots Riley and The Coup are working out of a tradition of music
that extends at least as far back as Gil Scott-Heron and the last poets in the
early '70s, and politically to the Black Panther party that was highly active
in the Oakland area where Riley grew up. He absorbed their message of black
nationalism, unity with the white counterculture and an identification with
the poor and the powerless. When Riley talks about guns in his songs, he's
not some gangster rapper seeking gold and groupies. He's talking about
defending himself against a system he sees as corrupt. This political point
of view even extends to the dreamiest love song The Coup can come up with.

(Soundbite of "Baby Let's Have a Baby Before Bush Do Somethin' Crazy")

SILK-E: (Singing)
Baby, let's have a baby, before Bush do something crazy.
Baby, let's have a baby, before Bush do some, something crazy.
I don't want the world to blow
before we get a chance to let our love grow.
I don't want the world to blow
before we get a chance to let our love grow.

I don't really want to fuss and fight.
Baby, we might have numbered nights.

(End of soundbite)

Mr. TUCKER: The title of that song, in case you missed the refrain, is "Baby
Let's Have a Baby Before Bush Do Somethin' Crazy." It features the nicely
ragged croon of singer Silk-E.

Boots Riley is the most accommodating host, generous about letting other
people speak his words. On this song called "My Favorite Mutiny," a member of
The Roots' Black Thought enunciated Riley's anti-brutality proclamation.

(Soundbite of "My Favorite Mutiny")

BLACK THOUGHT: (Singing)

Check it out.
Move, if you got the nerve
Lash out for your just desserts
It's not just the worth
Some of y'all heads up in the clouds
I'ma bring y'all back to earth.
It's black back to birth
(Censored by network)...y'all talkin' 'bout
Out ya mouth, I'm not concerned
Cause y'all got the nerve
It's y'all turn like Detroit Red
When he said he had an ultra perm
The long walk to burn your bare heels
So they worn your boots
The game camouflage like army suits
But I can see it more clear cause I came with the coup in here
Ring the alarm and form the troops
Send 'em out into the world, go to war in a fluke
Eye to eye with the enemy you sworn to shoot
Now comin' at ya neck sick ya hand, something wrong with me
(Censored by network)...somethin's wrong with you
When you cheat just way to smart to question

(End of soundbite)

Mr. TUCKER: Boots Riley was recently quoted as saying, "We've been taught to
overlook actually fighting the system together to make our life better." As
you can imagine, this is not the sentiment of someone who's making platinum
best-sellers. But it has aligned him with some interesting colleagues. The
Coup toured with the British rabble-rouser Billy Bragg and the country rock
rabble-rouser Steve Earle last year. And the varied, often catchy music on
"Pick a Bigger Weapon" suggests that he's getting ever closer to his ideal:
propaganda as art, art as music that works as both pleasure and provocation
for a mass audience.

GROSS: Ken Tucker is editor at large for Entertainment Weekly.

(Credits)

GROSS: I'm Terry Gross.
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